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█ Abstract Sinhababu’s Humean Nature contains many interesting and important ideas, but in this short 
commentary I focus on the idea of vivid representations. Sinhababu inherits his idea of vivid representa-
tions from Hume’s discussions, in particular his discussion of calm and violent passions. I am sympathetic 
to the idea of developing Hume’s insight that has been largely neglected by philosophers. I believe that 
Sinhababu and Hume are on the right track. What I do in this short commentary is to raise some ques-
tions about the details. The aim of asking these questions is not to challenge Sinhababu’s proposal (at 
least his main ideas), but rather to point at some interesting issues arising out of his proposal. The ques-
tions are about (1) the nature of vividness, (2) the effects of vivid representations, and (3) Sinhababu’s 
account of alief cases. 
KEYWORDS: Vivid Representation; Desire; Procrastination; Akrasia; Alief 
 
█ Riassunto Le rappresentazioni vivide e i loro effetti – Humean Nature di Neil Sinhababu contiene molte 
idee interessanti e importanti; tuttavia in questo breve commento intendo concentrarmi sulle rappresenta-
zioni vivide. Sinhababu eredita l’idea di rappresentazione vivida dalle analisi di Hume, in particolare 
dall’analisi delle passioni calme e violente. Condivido l’intento di sviluppare questa intuizione di Hume, am-
piamente trascurata dai filosofi. Credo che Sinhababu e Hume siano sulla strada giusta. Quanto intendo fare 
in questo breve commento è sollevare alcune questioni di dettaglio, il cui fine non è quello di mettere in di-
scussione la proposta di Sinhababu (quantomeno nei suoi intenti principali), quanto piuttosto di indicare 
alcuni punti interessanti che emergono dalla sua proposta. Le mie questioni investono (1) la natura della vi-
videzza, (2) gli effetti delle rappresentazioni vivide e (3) la descrizione di Sinhababu dei casi di alief. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Rappresentazione vivida; Desiderio; Differimento; Akrasia; Alief 

SINHABABU’S HUMEAN NATURE CONTAINS 
many interesting and important ideas, but in 
this short commentary I focus on the idea of 
vivid representations and their effects on 
mind and behavior. The following idea plays 
a crucial role in Sinhababu’s discussions in, 
among other places, Chapter 7 and 8. 
Amplification by Vividness: The effects of 
desire that E increase proportionally with 
the vividness of sensory or imaginative 
representations of things we associate 
with E.1 
 
Sinhababu argues that this idea helps us 
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to make sense of a wide range of puzzling 
phenomena, such as procrastination, akrasia, 
and the Skywalk experience. The crucial idea 
in Sinhababu’s accounts of these phenomena 
is that a vivid representation of an object in-
creases the effects of relevant desires, motivat-
ing the person to behave and feel in a particu-
lar way toward the object. So, for instance, the 
vivid sensory representation of Facebook in-
creases the effects of my desire for Facebook, 
which explains why I spend so much time on 
Facebook rather than on the book manuscript 
that I really want to work on. 
Sinhababu inherits this idea from Hume’s 
discussions, in particular his discussion of 
calm and violent passions. I am sympathetic 
to the idea of developing Hume’s insight that 
has been largely neglected by philosophers 
(with some exceptions, such as T.S. Gen-
dler).2 I believe that Sinhababu and Hume 
are on the right track. What I do in this short 
commentary is to raise some questions about 
the details. The aim of asking these questions 
is not to challenge Sinhababu’s proposal (at 
least his main ideas), but rather to point at 
some interesting issues arising out of his pro-
posal. The questions are about (1) the nature 
of vividness, (2) the effects of vivid represen-
tations, and (3) Sinhababu’s account of alief 
cases. 
 
█  The nature of vividness 
 
The first question is about what vividness 
is. Sinhababu does not say much about the 
nature of vividness, which is the key factor of 
Amplification by Vividness. He does provide 
some examples:  
 
The passion that motivates me to get vac-
cinated is typically a calm one. But if I’m 
presented with gruesome images of the 
disease I’m being vaccinated against, I’ll 
be more motivated to get vaccinated, and 
I’ll feel more anxious about not going 
 
while I’m most violently averse to being 
pricked by the doctor’s needle moments 
before it happens, my aversions to being 
pricked again in twenty years is much 
calmer, since I don’t represent the distant 
future as vividly 
 
I may run to the pool eagerly on a warm 
summer’s day, thinking of the fun of 
swimming with my friends. But when I’m 
about to leap in and my body has a fore-
taste of the initial bracing cold, I may hes-
itate, and have to will myself to jump.3 
 
These examples help us to guess what 
Sinhababu has in mind when he talks about 
vividness or vivid representations. But the 
idea of vividness is so central to Sinhababu’s 
discussions that it would be reasonable to ask 
for more precise and informative characteri-
zations. 
It would be useful to begin with Hume, 
from whom Sinhababu takes the ideas. 
Hume actually says a lot about what he calls 
“force”, “vivacity”, “liveliness”, etc. Hume’s 
discussions suggest that these terms refer to a 
particular kind of phenomenal property (alt-
hough there are some exegetical disputes in 
particular when these terms are used in the 
definition of beliefs).4 Hume uses these terms 
in the very beginning of the book 1 of his 
Treatise where he discusses the distinction 
between impressions (including sensory rep-
resentations) and ideas (including imagina-
tive representations). Hume argues that «the 
difference betwixt [impressions and ideas] 
consists in the degrees of force and liveliness 
with which they strike upon the mind».5 Im-
pressions are more forceful, vivacious, lively, 
etc. than ideas, although there are some ex-
ceptional cases; «in sleep, in a fever, in mad-
ness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, 
our ideas may approach to our impression»; 
«it sometimes happens, that our impressions 
are so faint and low, that we cannot distin-
guish them from our ideas».6 
A view one might find in Hume, then, is 
that vividness is a phenomenal property that 
distinguishes impressions from ideas and, in 
particular, sensory representations from im-
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aginative ones in such a way that typically the 
former are more vivid than the latter. Let us 
call this “Hypothesis 1”. According to Hy-
pothesis 1, for instance, the sensory represen-
tation of Facebook is more vivid than the 
imaginative representation of it. 
Is Hypothesis 1 consistent with Sinhaba-
bu’s claims? I am not sure about this. Amplifi-
cation by Vividness suggests that some imagi-
native representations can be vivid, at least 
more vivid than other imaginative representa-
tions. One might think that this contradicts 
Hypothesis 1. But not necessarily. This idea 
does not contradict Hypothesis 1 for example 
when the the vivid imaginative representa-
tions are still less vivid than sensory ones. Am-
plification by Vividness might also suggests 
that some sensory representations are not very 
vivid, at least less vivid than other sensory rep-
resentations. For instance, the gruesome im-
ages of a disease might be more vivid than the 
sentences in a page of a book describing the 
harmful consequences of the disease. Again, 
one might think that this contradicts Hypoth-
esis 1. But not necessarily. This idea does not 
contradict Hypothesis 1 for example when the 
non-vivid sensory representations are still 
more vivid than imaginative ones (e.g., the 
sensory representation of the page of the book 
is more vivid than the imaginative representa-
tion of the gruesome images). 
An interesting issue is whether Sinhababu 
allows for the possibility that some imagina-
tive representations are as vivid as, and possi-
bly more vivid than, some sensory representa-
tions, which does contradict Hypothesis 1. 
Maybe he does allow for the possibility. Refer-
ring to O’Craven and Kanwisher,7 he empha-
sizes the similarities between sensory and im-
aginative representations; «both the Hedonic 
Aspect and Amplification by Vividness respond 
to “vivid sensory or imaginative representa-
tion”. These representations are neurally real-
ized in very similar ways, suggesting that they 
have similar effects».8 The idea here seems to 
be that vividness is what is shared between 
sensory and imaginative representations ra-
ther than what distinguishes them. 
What, then, is vividness if it is something 
that is shared between sensory and imagina-
tive representations? A hypothesis would be 
that vividness has something to do with visu-
al modality (and perhaps other sensory mo-
dalities). Both sensory and imaginative repre-
sentations have visual modality and hence 
both are vivid, according to this hypothesis. 
Let us call this “Hypothesis 2”. According to 
Hypothesis 2, the sensory representation of 
Facebook and the imaginative representation 
of it are both visual and vivid. Is Hypothesis 2 
really consistent with Sinhababu’s view? A 
problem is that Hypothesis 2 might not be 
consistent with the idea, which is crucial in 
Amplification by Vividness, that vividness 
comes in degrees. It is far from obvious, for 
example, that visual modality comes in de-
grees. Are some sensory representations more 
visual than other sensory ones? Or, are some 
sensory representations more visual than 
some imaginative ones? 
An alternative hypothesis comes from an-
other discussion by Hume, the one Sinhaba-
bu actually refers to when introducing Ampli-
fication by Vividness. Here is Sinhababu’s 
summary of the discussion. 
 
Themistocles thought of a plan to give 
Athens naval supremacy by launching a se-
cret mission to burn the ships of all the 
other Greek kingdoms, which were gath-
ered in a nearby port. Since those king-
doms would learn of the plan and take pre-
cautions if he expressed it openly, he only 
told the Athenians that he had a secret 
plan that would benefit them greatly. The 
Athenians had him explain the plan to 
Aristides alone, whose judgment they 
completely trusted. Aristides reported back 
to the Athenians that the plan would be 
greatly advantageous to Athens but terri-
bly unjust. Upon hearing this, the Atheni-
ans unanimously voted against the plan.9 
 
The reason why the proposed advantage 
did not convince Athenians is that «[t]he no-
tion of advantage, being a very general idea, 
  Miyazono 
 
76 
isn’t conducive to vivid imagining».10 In 
Hume’s own words, «a general idea [...] is 
commonly more obscure» and «the more 
general and universal any of our ideas are, the 
less influence they have upon the imagina-
tion».11 This example suggests another hy-
pothesis, “Hypothesis 3”, according to which 
vividness has something to do with particular-
ity. The notion of advantage is too general. 
What is needed in order to convince Atheni-
ans is to give them more details about the par-
ticular advantage he was talking about.12 Does 
Hypothesis 3 capture Sinhababu’s notion of 
vividness? In his discussion of procrastination, 
Sinhababu argues that procrastination occurs 
for example when Facebook is represented 
more vividly than the the book manuscript 
that I am working on. But is Facebook more 
particular than the book manuscript? In what 
sense? Certainly, the name “Facebook” refers 
to a particular social networking service, but 
“the book manuscript” also refers to a particu-
lar book manuscript. 
Here is another problem, which is related 
to Descartes’ famous discussion of a chili-
agon in his Meditations. A particular chili-
agon is no less particular than a particular 
triangle, but it is difficult for us to vividly im-
agine the former:  
 
When I imagine a triangle, for example, I 
do not merely understand that it is a fig-
ure bounded by three lines, but at the 
same time I also see the three lines with 
my mind’s eye as if they were present be-
fore me; and this is what I call imagining. 
But if I want to think of a chiliagon, alt-
hough I understand that it is a figure con-
sisting of a thousand sides just as well as I 
understand the triangle to be a three-
sided figure, I do not in the same way im-
agine the thousand sides or see them as if 
they were present before me.13   
 
Hypothesis 3 might not be an independ-
ent hypothesis in its own light. Perhaps Hy-
pothesis 3 is actually reducible into Hypothe-
sis 2. Vividness has something to do with the 
visual modality, and and the reason why gen-
eral ideas are not conducive to vivid imagin-
ing is that they are unlikely to be represented 
visually. For instance, the general idea of ad-
vantage cannot be visually represented. Par-
ticular ideas are more likely to be visually 
represented than general ideas. But it is not 
the case that all particular ideas can be visual-
ly represented. A particular triangle can be 
visually represented, but a particular chili-
agon cannot be, which might explain why the 
latter is not conducive to vivid imagining. 
Another idea, which might be worth con-
sidering, would be that vividness has some-
thing to do with what neuroscientists and 
psychologists call “salience”, “incentive sali-
ence”, or “motivational salience”. For in-
stance, Berridge and Robinson write: 
 
Incentive salience has both perceptual 
and motivational features. According to 
our hypothesis, it transforms the brain's 
neural representations of conditioned 
stimuli, converting an event or stimulus 
from a neutral ‘cold’ representation (mere 
information) into an attractive and ‘want-
ed’ incentive that can ‘grab attention’. But 
incentive salience is not merely perceptual 
salience. It is also motivational, and is an 
essential component of the larger process 
of reward. Its attribution transforms the 
neural representation of a stimulus into 
an object of attraction that animals will 
work to acquire. It can also make a re-
warded response the thing rewarded.14 
 
The two aspects of salience, namely per-
ceptual aspects (objects look “attractive” and 
“grab attention”) and motivational aspects 
(“animals will work acquire” the objects), 
might correspond to the two aspects of viv-
idness Sinhababu talks about, namely the 
perceived vividness and its motivational con-
sequences.  
 
█ The effects of vivid representations 
 
The second question is about what vivid-
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ness does. According to Amplification by Viv-
idness, vivid representations increase the ef-
fects of desires. For instance, a vivid sensory 
representation of Facebook increases the ef-
fects of desire for Facebook, which explains 
procrastination.    
 
I waste a lot of time on the internet. At 
noon, I plan to spend the evening working 
on my book rather than goofing around on 
Facebook. This book is fun to write, so 
wasting time isn’t even that much more fun. 
At that time, representations of both goals 
and temptations have equal low vividness. 
My preference for working on the book to-
night, under these conditions, testifies to my 
stronger desire to do it. But when the even-
ing comes and I’m at the computer, the 
charms of the internet are more vividly rep-
resented to me than the benefits of work.15 
  
This account of procrastination is certainly 
attractive, but it might not be the whole story. 
In particular, Sinhababu does not explain why 
Facebook becomes more vivid than the book 
manuscript. Both are are particular objects that 
are visually represented. In virtue of what Fa-
cebook is more vivid than the book manu-
script? This is even puzzling given The Atten-
tional Aspect which says that «desires that E 
disposes one to attend to things one associated 
with E, increasing with the desire’s strength and 
the strength of the association».16 In this case 
the desire to work on the book manuscript is 
said to be stronger than the desire for Face-
book, which predicts, with The Attentional As-
pect, that attention will be paid to the book 
manuscript rather than to Facebook. 
In any case, my second question is about 
the strength of desires. Sinhababu maintains 
that vividness increases the effects of a desire 
but this does not mean that the it increases 
the strength of it. For instance, when Face-
book is vividly represented, the vividness in-
creases the effects of the desire for Facebook 
but it does not make the desire stronger, in 
particular, stronger than competing desires 
such as the desire to work on the book manu-
script. This idea seems to be crucial for Sin-
hababu, in particular in the context of ex-
plaining irrational behaviors. Explaining an 
irrational behavior does not only require ex-
plaining why the person behaves in the par-
ticular way. It also requires explaining why 
behaving in that way is irrational. Suppose 
my obsession with Facebook is irrational. 
Explaining my irrational obsession with Fa-
cebook does not just require explaining why I 
spend so much time on Facebook. It also re-
quires explaining why my spending so much 
time on Facebook is irrational. Amplification 
by Vividness does explain why I spend so 
much time on Facebook in terms of the vivid 
sensory representation of Facebook and its 
effects on behavior. It explains why my 
spending so much time on Facebook is irra-
tional in terms of the fact that, although the 
effects of my desire for Facebook are in-
creased, the desire itself is not strong, in par-
ticular not stronger than competing desires 
such as the desire to work on the book manu-
script. I am irrational because I am behaving 
against my stronger desires. 
However, this idea that vividness increases 
the effects of a desire without increasing its 
strength rests upon the assumption that the 
strength of a desire is independent of its ef-
fects, which is potentially problematic. Ac-
cording to functionalism, for instance, mental 
states are defined in terms of their causal roles, 
which includes their effects. Desires and be-
liefs are distinguished from each other in 
terms of their causal roles; desires play desire-
like causal roles, and beliefs play belief-like 
causal roles. Functionalists might also think 
that the strength of mental states is defined in 
terms of their causal roles. For instance, a 
strong desire and a weak desire are distin-
guished from each other in terms of their 
causal roles. Strong desires have strong effects, 
and weak desires have weak effects. From 
such a functionalist point of view, it is not 
possible that vividness increases the effects of 
a desire without increasing its strength. 
Perhaps Sinhababu is not a functionalist, 
at least when it comes to the strength of de-
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sires. Sinhababu gives an analogy to illustrate 
his commitments. We can truly say that 
“Usain Bolt is faster than Jerry Fodor” even 
when Bolt is asleep and Fodor is afoot. Being 
fast is a dispositional property which is tem-
porarily masked when Bolt is asleep. Similar-
ly, we can truly say that “my desire to work 
on the book manuscript is stronger than my 
desire for Facebook” even when I spend so 
much time on Facebook which is vividly rep-
resented. Having a strong desire to work on 
the book manuscript is a dispositional prop-
erty which is temporarily masked when Fa-
cebook is vividly represented. But is this 
analogy really good? Certainly it is counterin-
tuitive to say that temporarily Bolt is not 
faster than, or is slower than, Fodor when 
Bolt is asleep and Fodor is afoot. But it is 
much less counterintuitive to say that tempo-
rarily the desire to work on the book manu-
script is not stronger than, or is weaker than, 
the desire for Facebook when Facebook is 
vividly represented. After all, desires often 
get stronger or weaker temporarily depend-
ing on contexts and situations. For instance, I 
have a strong desire for good beer, perhaps 
stronger than many other desires I have. But 
this desire gets weaker temporarily after 
drinking more than 3 or 4 pints. Temporarily 
I am in the state in which I do not want to 
drink any more. 
In the quote below, Sinhababu seems to 
be talking about two different ideas about 
desire strength.   
 
To answer the objection, we should use the 
different measures of desire strength that 
our different theoretical purposes require, 
considering the effects of Amplification by 
Vividness when explaining motivation but 
ignoring them when assessing practical ra-
tionality. When theorizing about what 
people actually do, defenders of the 
Humean Theory should acknowledge how 
vividness amplifies the motivational effect 
of desires. Then they can explain why peo-
ple pursue vividly represented temptation. 
But Humeans about practical rationality 
should just work with desire strength un-
derstood dispositionally, without consider-
ing how vividness amplifies desire’s motiva-
tional effects. Even if the vividness of a 
temptation makes someone pursue it, it 
doesn’t make such pursuit rational.17 
 
Unfortunately, this quote is not very clear. 
One one hand, Sinhababu talks about “two 
measures of desire strength”, which might 
suggest that there are two different kinds of 
desire strength; the one that is influenced by 
vividness and the one that is not. One the 
other hand, he also says that vividness ampli-
fies the motivational effect of desires (not 
that it amplifies the strength of desires), 
which suggests that there is only one kind of 
desire strength; the one that is not influenced 
by vividness.   
 
█ The alief cases 
 
The third question is about Gendler’s 
alief. Sinhababu is very skeptical about alief 
because of the lack of informative characteri-
zations of alief. But I am less skeptical about 
alief. At least, I believe that Gendler provides 
plenty of informative cases including the fa-
mous Skywalk case18 and shows how we can 
make sense of the puzzling features of the 
cases in terms of what people alieve. And, as 
Sinhababu admits, Gendler’s characteriza-
tions are at least informative enough for 
some philosophers to appeal to aliefs in dif-
ferent philosophical discussions. 
It is true that Gendler does not provide a 
very clear definition of alief. But not having a 
very clear definition of a mental state does 
not give a good reason to deny the existence 
of the state. We are committed to the exist-
ence of beliefs, desires, and other mental 
states not because they are clearly defined 
but because they are explanatorily useful. 
Functionalists, for example, might define be-
liefs as the mental states that play belief-like 
causal roles. But this is far from a very clear 
definition of belief because, as Schwitzgebel 
points out, “belief-like causal roles” are not 
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very clearly defined;  
 
[p]hilosophers frequently endorse func-
tionalism about belief without even brief-
ly sketching out the various particular 
functional relationships that are supposed 
to be involved.19  
 
Sinhababu seems to think that he pro-
vides a clear characterization, if not a defini-
tion, of desire:  
 
I hope that Chapter 2’s account of desire 
shows how to characterize mental states so 
that they can provide interesting explana-
tions. It doesn’t just say that desire has 
some unspecified motivational, affective, 
and attentional effects. It tells you which 
activating phenomena will make a desire 
with a particular content produce particu-
lar effects. This makes clear how desire af-
fects thought, feeling, and action.20  
 
But it should also be noted that Sinhaba-
bu does not provide a very clear characteriza-
tion of vividness in terms of which he ex-
plains how desire works. 
But the lack of the clear characterization 
of alief is not Sinhababu’s main point. The 
main point is rather that alief is explanatorily 
redundant because Gendler’s cases can be 
explained without introducing alief. In par-
ticular, the Skywalk case is explained by Am-
plification by Vividness, which we have inde-
pendent reasons to accept, for example in the 
context of explaining other phenomena such 
as procrastination and akrasia. This is cer-
tainly an important challenge for Gendler. 
Sinhababu’s basic idea is that the effects of 
the desire not to fall is amplified by the vivid 
representations of the Skywalk. The person 
vividly sees the real Skywalk perhaps after a 
long drive, and the vivid representation in-
creases the effects of the desire not to fall: 
 
When you’re about to step out onto the 
Skywalk and you see the ground below, 
the sudden very vivid representation of 
extreme heights amplifies your aversion 
to falling to your death. This representa-
tion wasn’t vivid earlier, so you were able 
to make travel plans, drive, and pay the 
entry fee without being paralyzed by fear. 
[...] We can understand hesitation in 
stepping out onto the Skywalk in terms of 
the motivational effects of an extremely 
low credence combined with an intense 
aversion when we have incredibly vivid 
representations of its object.21 
 
There are some worries about this account. 
Sinhababu argues in Chapter 2 that a vivid 
representation might fail to increase the ef-
fects of a desire because the amplified motiva-
tion is overwhelmed by some other beliefs:  
 
[v]ivid sensations can eventually reduce 
motivation by producing beliefs – for ex-
ample, when someone wants to eat a deli-
cious-looking fruit but then sees another 
person become sick after eating it.22  
 
I do not know why the same thing does not 
happen in the Skywalk case. In other words, I 
don’t know why the amplified desire not to 
fall is not overwhelmed by the belief that the 
Skywalk is safe. After all, as Sinhababu points 
out, the subjective probability of falling would 
be extremely low. The degree of belief in the 
Skywalk case that the Skywalk is safe might be 
as high as, or higher than, the degree of belief 
in Sinhababu’s example that the fruit makes 
me sick. 
Another worry is that Sinhababu only tells 
us one side of the story. There is another side, 
which is about another desire the person has 
about the Skywalk, namely, the desire to enjoy 
the Skywalk, which motivated her to come all 
the way to the Skywalk. It is a desire about the 
Skywalk and, hence, Amplification by Vividness 
predicts that the effects of this desire is ampli-
fied by the vivid representation of the Skywalk. 
But, then, the prediction from Amplification by 
Vividness might be that she becomes so excited 
and runs toward the Skywalk as fast as she can. 
Sinhababu might think that the hesitation is 
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exactly what we should predict when we put 
the two sides of the story together. She shows 
some hesitation when trying to step on the 
Skywalk because of the amplified desire not to 
fall together with the amplified desire to enjoy 
the Skywalk. Both desires are amplified, and 
her hesitation is the product of their competing 
with each other. But, this solution might not be 
satisfactory. Suppose that both desires are am-
plified roughly to the same degree. But we also 
need to take relevant beliefs into account. The 
desire not to fall is certainly amplified, but its 
influence on behavior should be discounted (if 
not overwhelmed) by the strong belief that the 
Skywalk is safe. But, then, the desire to enjoy 
the Skywalk, which is also amplified but not 
discounted, should be dominant and hence the 
prediction should be that she enjoys the Sky-
walk with little or no hesitation. 
Probably this problem can be generalized to 
many cases in which there are two competing 
desires about one object. For instance, accord-
ing to Sinhababu, a vivid representation of 
Faceook increases the effects of my desire for 
Facebook, which explains why I spend so much 
time on Facebook. But maybe I have a compet-
ing desire about Facebook, namely the desire to 
avoid Facebook which has devastating impact 
on my productivity. Indeed, it seems to me that 
many, if not all, procrastinators are perfectly 
aware of the main causes of procrastination, 
such as Facebook, and they want to avoid them 
seriously. Then, the vivid representation of Fa-
cebook increases not just the effects of my de-
sire for Facebook but also the effects of my de-
sire to avoid Facebook. But, then, Sinhababu’s 
account is not sufficient to explain why I spend 
so much time on Facebook and why it is so dif-
ficult for me to avoid it. Note that the relevant 
competition here is not between the amplified 
desire for Facebook and the amplified desire to 
avoid it. Rather it is between the amplified de-
sire for Facebook and the amplified desire to 
avoid it together with the desire, which is not 
amplified but is reasonably strong, to work on 
the manuscript. 
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